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Reform  Is Not Enough
Steven J. Taff
If praying to the gods for rain does not  increase the fertility of our fields, it avails little to redouble our
prayers  or to make  alteration in our wording; we would  better turn our energies to the techniques of
agriculture.
- Robert S. Lynd
Background
Advocates  of a sustainable agriculture increasingly argue that federal  agricultural policy is  a
major barrier to the adoption of alternative farming systems.  There have been  many calls to reform,  my
own among them.  Two years ago in this forum,  I noted three aspects of U.S. farm  policy that seemed to
stand in  the way of farmers  moving in  the direction of more sustainable practices.  First, price  supports
and subsidies are so lucrative that farmers face severe financial losses if  they stop producing  all they can
of the handful of crops so protected.  Second, because farming practices are largely exempt from
liability from any off-farm damages they might cause, farmers have  no particular Incentive to shift to
practices that might  reduce such damages.  Finally, farming  risk is  partly dealt with through the federally
subsidized crop insurance program.  This reduces the incentive farmers might  have to manage  risk
through crop diversification, for example, and the relatively small number  of crops insured ensures that
many farmers won't try new  ones.
While  policy reform  seems a logical precondition for a sustainable agriculture, it is in danger of
being oversold.  I wish to argue today that while changes in federal farm  policy might  be necessary to
permit a full flowering  of sustainable agriculture, they will not be sufficient.  We tend to overemphasize
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dominate.  Second, I will argue that even if we agree that changes need to be made,  we will be  unable
to accomplish many of the farm-level  goals of sustainable agriculture with  so blunt an  instrument as
federal farm  policy.  National policy may be reshaped to let farmers do Good, but it is ill  suited to make
them do Good.  Finally,  I will propose that our attention to leveling the playing field for sustainable
agriculture might  be misplaced.  Reform  may not only not be  enough, it may actually hinder the adoption
of sustainable agriculture on a  broad scale.
The Sustainable Agriculture  Platform  and Farm  Policy
In what follows, "policy" should be thought of as a set of rules that condition behavior in
government and in  markets.  The way we  run American society is to set the conditions for market
activity, let the markets run, and then come in and  pick up the pieces if we don't like the outcome.
Without  societal rules (government acting through policies),  markets could  not exist.  If you accept this,
then you rule out any cries to "get  government out of agriculture."  Instead, you try to decide in what
ways public decisions should affect private decisions with respect to agricultural  production.  In a
moment,  I'll try to stylize private decisions so that we can fruitfully examine the ways in which the public
might influence private farm management  choices.
First, let me outline an also stylized version of the sustainable agriculture  platform.  As I see it,
the four major planks of the movement  as it has been politically actualized are safe food,  prosperous
farmers,  a safe environment, and prosperous  communities.  Today,  I'm  going to focus upon only two of
these:  a safe environment and  prosperous farmers.  The others are clearly Important,  but they have been
largely untouched  by the debate swirling around  American farm policy, reified by the quadrennial farm
bill.  Safe food as a political Issue has been captured  by chemists, nutritionists,  and consumer safety
advocates.  Prosperous communities,  whose  link to the other planks is often asserted but rarely
examined,  have been left to rural sociologists and  prairie populists.  But both the farm establishment and
most emerging farm environmentalist  interests are at home with the two planks I'll  examine today.
2One way to characterize the sustainable agriculture movement  is that it seeks to influence both
farming--how farmers  practice their craft--and farm  structure--how many farmers control  how much land.
The two may or may not be linked: the research evidence continues to be  mixed.  But the two are
clearly not affected in the same ways by farm  policy.  Our attention today is on the practice of farming--
crop selection, input use, and tillage regimes.  How might farm policy influence farmer choices with
respect to these?
The traditional focus of farm policy in this country has been the farm bill, a piece  of omnibus
legislation that Congress takes on every four years or so.  (Most of what I, along with most of the
sustainable agriculture policy literature,  say here is relevant only to crop agriculture.  Animal  agriculture,
with the notable exception of dairy, is only indirectly influenced  by farm policy, for a variety of practical
and historical reasons.  Policy leverage is possible on the crop side, far more difficult on the livestock
side.)
If a single goal for American  farm programs  over the years could be teased out of the welter of
legislation,  it would  probably be the stabilization of farm output prices at a level that provides a decent
living to farmers without infuriating consumers.  The major implementing  instruments  have been  (and
likely will remain)  income subsidies,  cropland retirement,  price supports, and  education.  In  brief, we try
to manage output prices by increasing or decreasing the amount of land on which crops are allowed to
be grown.  If the resulting prices are still too low, we pay a cash  bonus on each unit of production.  If
the environment suffers, we try to convince farmers  to change their ways.  If that doesn't work,  we pay
them to change.
Choice Set
Let me  illustrate this by reference to what I'll  call the farmer's  choice set.  We all have choice
sets.  They're simply the combination of all our aspirations, endowments,  opportunities, and constraints.
Any non-random decision we make  is within the context of our own choice sets.  Changing the
constituents of the set will often change the decision made within it.
3One way of looking at the farmer's choice set is to put it  into a maximizing  framework:  the
farmer maximizes  something  by selecting actions subject to certain opportunities and  constraints.  Not
all farmers act to maximize profits, farm income,  or sales, although a great many do.  Some  instead are
interested in maximizing family income (including  off-farm wages),  minimizing personal  time investment,
or maximizing that elusive concept "lifestyle."  No two farmers are exactly alike in this  respect, although it
is often  useful analytically or Imperative  politically for us to act as if they were all the same.
Farmers,  at various points in their careers, are  able to choose from  among a variety of actions to
help them reach their goals.  They might choose among enterprises  (livestock, grains,  specialty crops),
among  scales (big farm,  small farm),  or among input  philosophies (chemical,  low chemical,  organic), to
name  a few.  The  number and timing  of these choices are  not common  to all farmers,  however,  as we
shall see below.
Opportunities, which  can  be thought of as those forces that enable farmers to make  certain
decisions, include the characteristics of the land  over which they have  management  control, how much
personal wealth they bring to the situation, the level of input and output prices over which they have no
control  but within which they must make financial judgments,  and the nature of public incentives
(subsidies,  education, and the like) that are designed to influence farmer  behavior.
Constraints,  which don't always clearly differentiate themselves from opportunities, can be
thought of as those forces that  keep farmers from taking certain actions.  In this category we commonly
include regulations that govern management  behavior, taxes that Influence prices, a lack of sufficient
wealth,  the uncertainties  of rainfall, and the nonavailability of technological fixes.
Policy Changes
It is useful to think of government policies (like those  built into the farm  bill), those rules that
condition behavior, as attempts to alter components  of the farmer's choice set so that the resulting
private decisions increase public benefits or reduce public damages.  So,  for example, traditional
American soil conservation policy has stressed  the preaching of stewardship  (which tries to alter the
farmer's  maximand)  and the application of subsidized  conservation practices (which tries to alter the
prices faced  by the farmer).  When this was perceived to fail, or at least not succeed sufficiently,  new
4policies such as Swampbuster  (which is in effect a tax on prices received  by farmers)  or local
conservation ordinances (which restrict the farm  management  practices available to farmers)  have been
enacted.  A final recourse recently has been to buy, (as  in Minnesota's  RIM  Reserve),  or rent  (as  in the
federal  Conservation  Reserve Program),  the rights to crop certain environmentally sensitive lands,
thereby removing most  management  options on those lands completely.
Not all attempted  alterations of the farmer's choice set are equally effective in altering farmer
behavior in desired directions.  The federal farm  bill tries to do a lot of manipulation,  and some
sustainable agriculture  interests would have it do more.  But not all decisions are policy manipulable: we
may be able to influence but at the same time not steer.
Does this system need tinkering,  or abolition?  You'll  note that the sustainable agriculture  platform  is
quite different  in its goals than is the present set of programs, as I have characterized them.  I contend
that a system that was set up to manage  output prices at the national  level is  ill  suited to also manage
crop selection,  input  use,  and tillage decisions at the farm  level.  And It is with farm level decisions that
sustainable agriculture as a practical canon ought to be concerned.
Groundwater Pollution Example
To demonstrate the inherent bluntness of the farm policy instrument,  let's focus further on the
specific issue of agricultural  pesticides and groundwater quality.  No one would  argue that we  should
unnecessarily pollute our water, and few would argue that chemicals are ioso facto  bad; the problem
comes when we  misalign the privately optimal  use of pesticides and the publicly optimal  level of
contamination.  (I hold, along with  most economists, that zero pollution Is not necessarily the social
optimum.)
The  underlying policy issue is simple:  If we perceive a public interest in private farming decisions,
should we pay farmers to farm  in a certain way, or should we  make them?  Do farmers  have an
unimpeded right to manage resources in any way they see fit, or does society have an inalienable right
to protection from adverse farming  impacts?
5We have,  in our illustration,  some  pollution;  it clearly Is  associated with nearby farming  practices.  A
sustainable agriculture wouldn't feature as much pollution.  How might policy reforms bring this about?
Several fixes have been  suggested over the years:
(1) Remove the present subsidies and production incentives for certain crops (primarily corn,
wheat,  rice, and  cotton)  so that farmers can grow crops that  rely less upon chemical  pest control
strategies.  But simply lowering prices on some crops does not mean that farmers can profitably farm
other crops.
(2) Internalize the costs of pollution.  Shift pollution liability to farmers  so that their production
decisions factor these into account.  This  is a step our legislators  have largely been  unwillingly to take,
often because of a perception that this cost imposition would bankrupt  many farmers.
(3)  Provide new incentives for farming practices felt to lead to better water quality.  For
example, the USDA  already pays farmers to employ filter strips and for conservation tillage:  it might  pay
as well for rotations, or forage crops.
(4)  Convince farmers to make  less money.  If there is a trade-off between  environmentally
benign farming and  maximum  profit farming,  then we might try to show farmers  how it is to their
advantage to reduce one in favor of the other.
(5)  Increase off-farm job opportunities so that farmers don't  have to squeeze every dollar from
their farm  operation.  Unfortunately, many farm communities  are unlikely to ever create such
opportunities.
In each case, I think you'll  see that what we're  implicitly doing is altering the choice set  in the
context of which farmers make  management decisions.  It is the nature of most of these reforms,
however, to be pretty broad brushed.  Others may be perceived as being unfair.  A ban of a particular
herbicide, for example, forces all farmers to adjust their pest  control strategies, even though probably
only some subset of farmers is actually polluting the water.  (They may be polluting because they
misapply the chemical or because it  is impossible, given the particular chemical, their particular soils,
and the crop on which it is  used, to use the chemical without unacceptably polluting the groundwater.)
Is it cost effective to force all farmers to change in those situations in which only some farmers are the
source of the problem?  Would abolishing all subsidies affect all farmers equally?
6Policy Pitfalls
Any policy scheme that tries to influence individual behavior faces three problems.  We've just
touched on heterogeneity.  Every farmer is different--has a different choice set--so  not all farmers will
respond  the same way to a change in the policy environment.  Indeed,  some farmers perhaps should
not be expected to change  if they're not causing trouble.  Too, not all farmers  presently participate in
the major government farm programs.  Policy reform would leave many untouched.
The second policy pitfall travels under the name of "asymmetric  information."  Information,  or the
lack thereof, is the bane of all policy activists.  Not only aren't we sure how a given farmer might  react to
a change in policy, we usually aren't sure how a given action will affect the environment.  We can't even
be sure sometimes that the farmer even  changed  management  behavior in the first place.
Let me illustrate this second point.  Say we ban atrazine, a  herbicide that appears with
distressing frequency in groundwater and surface water samples throughout the Corn  Belt.  What will
farmers do?  Some will switch to different  chemicals, some of which might be even more deleterious.
Others  might shift to different tillage combinations, with uncertain effects upon surface water quality.  Not
only is each farmer different with respect to strategy, each farmer's  strategy is unknown to the policy
maker.
The third  problem  is one of enforcement.  Let's say that we  accept the policy risk that farmers
will react differently.  At least atrazine  use will go down, won't it?  But who will cut back, and  how will we
know?  For certain farm practices, it would be  prohibitively expensive to monitor compliance.  As long as
atrazine is being made somewhere,  you can expect some farmers to smuggle it into forbidden territory.
Who's to know?
If  we only want certain farmers  to change, a farm policy designed to influence national prices
won't work very well.  National policies are very often impotent when  it comes to directing particular
behaviors.  There  is clearly a place for national action in the crafting of a smorgasbord  of particular
incentives and disincentives, to be tailored to individual farmers  by a knowledgeable corps of public
servants.  But such an approach should shift our attention from public  policy reform to public
administration reform,  an altogether different subject.  The tradeoff would be the apparent simplicity but
7general  ineffectiveness of sweeping national reforms, and the apparent cost effectiveness but extreme
information costs of a fully targeted  set of programs.
Expected Reforms
The actual farm policy changes we're likely to get in the next few years are an easing of
commodity  base acreage  restrictions, some permitted flexibility in planting decisions among  program
crops, a modest  permanent conservation  easement acquisition program, the addition of groundwater to
conservation compliance provisions, an expanded federal crop insurance program,  and lower official
chemical use recommendations.  Not all these will lead to a more sustainable agriculture, but most are
probably moving in the right direction.
If the rules change like this, what are farmers likely to do?
(1) Most will continue to grow those  crops they know how to grow and  have the equipment to
manage.  Even without subsidies, corn and wheat are likely to remain the main crops of upper midwest
farmers.  They know how to grow corn and wheat, and they have the equipment to grow corn and
wheat.  In some areas, climate and soils combine to make wheat, in particular, one of the few crops one
can grow, whatever  its relative profitability.
(2)  If a new crop promises  high prices for more than a year or two,  some farmers will switch to
it in  small amounts.  This  is what we're seeing in dry edible beans in the Red  River Valley, for example.
These  new crops may support a sustainable agriculture goal of diversity, but their cumulative
environmental  effects are uncertain.
(3)  Most farmers can be expected to continue to manage  risk through insurance,  not through
rotation or diversification.  A larger subsidy for crop insurance could mean,  however, a modest  reduction
in the use of irrigation or chemicals to maintain expected yields at profitable levels.
(4)  Even when farmers establish rotations that  are financially, agronomically,  and
environmentally sound, there will remain the strong temptation to break out of that rotation  if a particular
crop's price goes through the ceiling.  How many could resist the temptation to cash  in on wheat, for
example, If China were to experience two straight years of horrible drought?  (More research,  both
8economic and agronomic,  needs to be done on this possibility.  How resilient are  soil and financial
systems to occasional deviations?)
Is Reform  Necessary?
All this is  not to say that farm  policy reform  such as that detailed above is not desirable,  from
both the broader public and the narrower  sustainable agriculture  points of view.  Few would argue
persuasively against a possible reduction in federal  budget outlays,  a narrowing of the gap  between farm
product demand  and supply, an  increase of the survival chances for small farmers,  or a reduction in the
Incentives to pollute.
But even  if such reform  is desirable, is  it necessary to achieve the aims of sustainable agriculture?  I
mention this because institutional change, or at least sweeping institutional  change, doesn't  happen
quickly, particularly when well-specified and well-represented  political interests are involved.  Too, as we
saw above, reform of the sort most often  proposed  might not lead to sweeping changes in the way
farmers farm.
An  environmentally benign agriculture  may not be sustainable, because farmers  may not choose to
practice it.  There is a difference between  a sustainable system's financial viability--you won't go broke if
you practice it-and some other system's financial dominance-you  can make  a lot more money that way.
While farm policy reform might reduce the dominance of certain traditional systems,  it still may not be
able to do much about other systems' viability.
There is also the danger that  reform  so levels the playing field that the whole field is under water.
Under  present price relationships, it might be the case that no system,  sustainable or otherwise,  is
financially viable without  income transfers from the non-farm  sector.
Could  American farmers move out of the shadow of the perverse influence of the farm programs--as
have many farmers already, for many reasons--without the prior dismantling of the programs?  Could
present subsidies and supports  serve as the transition aids so often talked about  but rarely funded?
Perhaps sustainable agriculture advocates should support the retention of current programs,  but try to
co-opt policy for their own  purposes.  Swampbuster  might be viewed as one such effort, although  In
9another forum  I would argue that Swampbuster's  problems  outweigh its benefits.  So  might some
advocates'  resistance to liberalized trade policy, so as not to lose potential  supply management  tools.
I realize that this runs counter to my previous assertion that farm  policy reform may not be the ticket.
But there I dealt implicitly with reform  as the abolition  of existing subsidies, the leveling of the playing
field.  Here, I'm talking not of abolition, but of subversion.
One runs a risk in trying to co-opt farm policy for inherently different objectives, of course.  The
attempt may fail,  leaving us both with a farm policy that doesn't serve national commodity stabilization
goals and with  no policy that serves largely local sustainable agricultural  goals.  The whole exercise
might be one of trying to pour new wine  into old skins.  What would we  have gained  if the skins burst?
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